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Abstract
In an era of high-profile hacks, information leaks and cybercrime, cybersecurity is the focus of
much corporate and state-funded research. Data visualization is regarded as an important tool in
the detection and prediction of risk and vulnerability in cybersecurity, but discussion tends to
remain at the level of the usability of visualization tools and how to reduce the cognitive load on
the consumers of the visualizations. This focus is rooted in a desire to simplify the complexity of
cybersecurity. This article argues that while usability and simplification are important goals for the
designers of visualizations, there is a much wider discussion that needs to take place about the
underlying narratives upon which these visualizations are based. The authors take the position that
the narratives on which cybersecurity visualizations are based ignore important aspects of cyberse-
curity and that their visual form causes the producers and users of these visualizations to focus too
narrowly on adversarial security issues, ignoring important aspects of social and community-based
security. By situating the discussion of security visualization in a larger socio-historical context, the
limitations and implications of current ways of seeing risk become more apparent. Cybersecurity
might also learn from other disciplines, specifically critiques of artificial intelligence and the
discourse and methods of post-war urban planning. In this way, the article follows a humanities
tradition of situating the focus of analysis in a broader tradition of scholarship and critiquing
current practices from this wider context. The purpose of such critique is to stimulate reflection on
underlying principles and the implications of different approaches to operationalizing those
principles. Finally, case studies of participatory modelling and crowdsourcing projects are dis-
cussed that aim to foster resilience through social and spatial practices. These case studies illus-
trate the potential for a wider range of visualizations.
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Introduction
In its 2013 impact assessment, the European Commission stated
that there is an ‘insufficient level of protection’ against network and
information security incidents undermining the ‘services that sup-
port our society’ (e.g. public administrations, finance and banking,
energy, transport, health) [10, p.12]. This suggests a complex
problem permeating all levels of society, but news headlines are in-
creasingly preoccupied with cyberterrorism and counterterrorism
(such as the Sony hack of 2014), which tends to constrain discussion
of information security to high stakes, high-profile incidents.
Discussion at the popular level assumes that the best hope of
cybersecurity is better surveillance, and information visualization
that has assumed an important role in fuelling this hope by
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presenting visually compelling images and tools for modelling risk
and vulnerability. But with growing and ageing populations and the
continuing push to move services online, including tax filing, retire-
ment, banking and medical interactions, the social complexity of in-
formation sharing practices presents a far more complex and
nuanced picture of ‘security’ than its typical visualization forms—
such as network diagrams and tree maps—currently achieve.
The argument of this article is that the predominant mode of visual-
ization in security comes from a statistical and probabilistic approach
that perpetuates a particular way of seeing the problem and that is
based on a relatively thin cybersecurity narrative. The dominant narra-
tive is one of cybersecurity as ‘control’, whereas critics argue that we
are in fact, ‘post control’ [8] in many senses and need to look to human
as well as technological security to respond to cybersecurity challenges.
Drawing from the lessons of critical cartography, this article
proposes that our visualization tools are wedded to a post-
enlightenment system of beliefs—whether we call it enumerative, ra-
tionalistic or military–industrial—tools which have been extensively
critiqued as technologies of a disciplinary, or control society. The
computing clouds, socio-technical networks and ‘wicked problems’ of
today cannot, technically, be contained, despite claims for ‘big data’
[26, 1, 7]. If, as its critics suggest, the discourse and visualization of
risk serve to perpetuate a performance of maintaining security rather
than investigating what makes social groups, communities, nations,
secure, then how else might the issue be approached?
Faith in data spheres
According to the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, the impulse
to make visualizations, maps and globes of space, knowledge and
our belief systems appears to date back to the 1490s (Fig. 1), specif-
ically the era in which the possibility unfolded that the earth was
neither enclosed by protective domes, nor was it at the centre of the
universe. With the loss of those ‘immunities’ as Sloterdijk calls them,
Europeans began fetishistically building and examining ball-shaped
images of earth, as if this would console them for the fact that they
no longer existed inside a ball, only on a ball. He then extends this
fetishistic project of building and defining finite spheres of know-
ledge and belief to industrial-scale civilization, the welfare state, the
world market and the media sphere. We might add to that list the
recent obsession with visualizing spheres of data:
all these large-scale projects aim, in a shell-less time, for an imita-
tion of the now impossible, imaginary spheric security. Now net-
works and insurance policies are meant to replace the celestial
domes [34, p. 25].
Many current visualizations of internet traffic demonstrate this
same spheric faith, such as Barrett Lyon’s map of the Internet from
2003 (http://www.opte.org/prints-licences/), showing traffic be-
tween the major Internet Service Providers (ISPs) (Fig. 2). On a par
perhaps with the ‘blue marble’ photograph (http://earthobservatory.
nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id¼1133) of the Earth taken by Apollo
17’s astronauts in 1972 (Fig. 3), it presupposes a finite project: the
entire Internet represented as a sphere of data. In many ways, the
visualization is a summation of presumptions. It not only suggests a
containable problem-space; it presumes a separation of network
traffic from the built environment in which it takes place.
The visual roots, so to speak, of this giant sprawling system, lie
in the idea of the tree of knowledge (Fig. 4), which as Manuel Lima
has shown, similarly reveal a rationalistic faith in finite systems
from the early Modern era, ‘the idea of capturing the entirety
of human knowledge and classifying it by means of a tree’ [21, pp.
33–41]. Trees have proven popular memes in predictive methods of
visualizing potential information security attacks and countermeas-
ures, but come with the recurrent problem of growing. When tree
diagrams grow too big, they become difficult to comprehend.
Figure 1. Hieronymus Bosch, Garden of Earthly Delights, 1503–4. Oil on
hinged oak panels, 220 x 389 cms, Museo del Prado, Madrid, seen here in
folded state. Public domain.
Figure 2. The Opte Project Map of the Internet, Barrett Lyon, 2003. Creative
Commons.
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If, to return to Sloterdijk’s diagnosis, spheric security is imagin-
ary, then we are left with the familiar compromised goal of achiev-
ing ‘sufficiently secure’ status. The compromise is in deciding what
can be modelled and visualized and what can be left out.
Reducing complexity
This brings us to a central paradox of visualization; we visualize to
make complex problems easier to understand and easier to navigate,
but to do this we must simplify the complexity. It is this process of
reduction and abstraction that often reveals the intent of visualiza-
tion. In the critical discourse of post-war cartography, decisions
made behind the scenes on what to show and what to omit from
maps will often reveal their larger, territorial agendas [15] and [43].
Designers aim to achieve simplicity or clarity in visualizations by
making them persuasive and/or easy to use, which suggests two cate-
gories of visualization; the rhetorical and explorative. Rhetorical
visualizations function primarily to make a point and inform a given
audience; these are typically static images governed by a discourse
focused on graphical integrity, elegance and clarity typified by the
approach of Edward Tufte (show the data, do not distort the data,
etc (see, for example, Fig. 5)). Tufte’s identification of infographic
decoration as ‘chartjunk’ or his account of how the oversimplifica-
tion endemic to Powerpoint presentation software played a part in a
Space Shuttle disaster are illustrative of this goal [36] and [37].
Explorative visualizations tend to pose questions, and are often
dynamic and interactive (Fig. 6). The discourse is focused on reduc-
ing cognitive load and making interactions with the computer
‘user-friendly’. The visual information mantra of interactive media-
oriented researcher Ben Shneiderman was ‘overview first, zoom and
filter, then details on demand’ [32]. This position accommodates a
technique known as ‘progressive disclosure’ which aims at initial
simplification followed by the option of revealing additional content
and options. It assumes, after psychologist William Edmund Hick,
that the time needed to make a decision increases with the number
of variables [21, p. 92]. Such an approach can be described as
cognitivist, in that it draws a trajectory from rationalistic human–
computer interaction approaches associated with classical artificial
intelligence. It is this visual tradition that has been primarily
adopted by cybersecurity researchers and practitioners.
Technologies of management
While clarity, usability and ‘details on demand’ are uncontroversial
standards that are understandably upheld in instrumentalist design
discourse focused on improvement of human–computer and
human–visualization interaction, it is important to situate such aims
in a larger historical discourse to understand the wider potential for
the development of cybersecurity visualization. The history of data
visualization can be traced back to the emergence of ‘thematic maps’
and information intensive graphics in the 17th century (Fig. 7),
which as geographer Jeremy Crampton has noted, was precisely
when enumerative strategies for population management became a
pressing concern for industrial and imperial Europe. They became
‘critical to censuses, census mapping, and distributions of popula-
tions across territories’ [5, p. 37]. Linking this discourse to contem-
porary practices of geosurveillance, Crampton follows Michel
Foucault in tracking how such technologies of management emerged
as a means to: (i) think of people and space as resources that
required management and protection, and (ii) to normalize through
the gathering and categorizing of data about populations, such as
censuses.
Standard approaches of visualizing threats to cybersecurity
deploy the Tufte and Shneiderman vocabulary in technologies
designed to extend the categorization and identification of abnormal
behaviours. For example, Raffael Marty’s 2009 text ‘Applied
Security Visualisation’ uses ‘progressive disclosure’ for iterative
elimination of ‘outliers’, based on analysis of which network nodes
are generating traffic with large packet sizes and whether they reveal
suspicious patterns of distribution [22]. This way, Marty arrives at a
suspect botnet controller. Visualization, according to Marty, is
worth ‘a thousand log records’. A visual, as opposed to textual
approach to risk analysis, is argued to facilitate the task of analysing
data traffic by relying on the human brain’s efficient ability to proc-
ess images and recognize patterns. A link graph (Fig. 8), showing
‘malicious insider threat’ derived from network traffic data is devel-
oped by listing ‘precursors’ (suspicious behaviours) to an insider
attack and ranking them according to a scale of potential danger.
This reflects a chief concern of information security in the era of
cloud computing; analyses of risks and threats in cloud computing
reports concur that insider attacks and malicious insiders are a
‘major technical risk and among the top 10 threats’ [2]. But the
surveillance and identification of potential threat also recalls the
shift that took place with legal reforms of the 18th and early 19th
centuries, famously observed by Foucault, from the punishment of
crimes to the identification of criminal potential:
The idea of ‘dangerousness’ meant that the individual must be
considered by society at the level of his potentialities, and not at
the level of his actions; not at the level of the actual violations of
an actual law, but at the level of the behavioural potentialities
they represented [12, p. 57].
Marty’s visualization presupposes fixed behaviour types: insiders
are either loyal or malicious. Such a distinction complies with mili-
taristic approaches of the past, but in cloud computing the distinc-
tion between insider and outsider is not easy to make. The concept
of insiderness is entwined with notions of trust, homogeneous
values, authorization, empowerment and control [4].
Figure 3. Earth, photographed from on board NASA mission Apollo 17, 1972.
Public domain.
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Figure 4. Ernst Haeckel, General Morpohology of Organisms, 1866. Public domain.
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Figure 5. The ‘Hockey Stick’ graph (named because of its shape), from the 2001 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This graph mobilized world-
wide debate on the topic of global warming. Image courtesy of IPCC, available at: www.grida.no.
Figure 6. Explorative visualization showing progressive disclosure. Reproduced with permission: www.recordedfuture.com.
Figure 7. Pie charts, William Playfair, 1801. From, The Commercial and Political Atlas: Representing, by Means of Stained Copper-plate Charts, the Progress of the
Commerce, Revenues, Expenditure and Debts of England During the Whole of the Eighteenth Century, 3rd edn. Public domain.
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Socio-technical problems and the AI legacy
Recent developments in information security, including the EU-
funded TREsPASS project, from which this article draws evidence
and a research framework, explore the limits and possibilities of vis-
ualization to support tools focused on predicting ‘socio-technical’
security risk. The hyphen that connects the social and technical
attempts to bridge a fundamental disciplinary and philosophical
divide. Loosely characterized, it bridges (or hopes to) the fields of
cryptography and human–computer interaction with the arts and so-
cial sciences. To risk putting too much weight on the hyphen, it also
bridges two sides of the artificial intelligence debate: one side that
considers it possible for machines to think, the other that does not.
Figure 8. ‘Insider candidate list’, shown as a link graph, referring to insider threat. Reproduced with permission from Raffael Marty, Applied Security
Visualization, 2009.
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To go back to the historical initiation of this debate, it is useful to
remember that Alan Turing’s machine, which famously cracked the
Enigma code in World War II, was part of his larger philosophical
inquiry into thinking machines. Turing’s ‘imitation game’ proposed
behavioural similarity as a measure of machine intelligence: if the
output of the machine and the human could not be detected, the
machine is, effectively, thinking. As is well known, the cracking of
the enigma code was made possible because of human sloppiness in
following the security protocols [24]. This point seems to support
the phrase, popular in the security community, that humans repre-
sent the ‘weakest link’ [41], suggesting that if the machines were left
to themselves, there would be no security threat.
But this position overlooks the fact that the interaction often
provides forms of security for the individual which may override the
security needs of the data. The question here is whether the referent
object is the person and the security of the person or the data and
the security of the data. If the referent object is the person then the
security of the data is only a means to the security of the person. The
critique of classical artificial intelligence (as derived from Turing)
that was most famously furthered by Hubert Dreyfus [9] makes the
point that human intelligence is embodied and situated; it cannot be
abstracted and isolated, and reproduced as a set of rules and sym-
bols. The world as we understand it, according to Dreyfuss and his
phenomenologist forebears, is not something independent of human
perception; its structures change as a result of human activity; it is
manifested in human experience [3, p. 7]. Critics of our rationalistic
age, then, fear that increasingly we are measuring and conforming
human behaviour to the logic and requirements of machines. Terry
Winograd and Fernando Flores [42] have developed the AI critique
to argue that computer systems need to be designed to take into ac-
count that the machines must function in the human world, commu-
nicating with humans [3, p. 21]. Despite the apparent advances in
AI research, visualization appears to sit firmly in a cognitivist pos-
ition premised on a disembodied intelligence.
Both the rhetorical and explorative approaches to visualization
tend to aspire to establishing a coherent and universal set of rules so
that visualizations do ‘function in the human world’, but the ex-
plorative approach is entrenched in the classical AI camp. A key text
by Colin Ware adopts a positivist, rationalistic approach, presuming
a universal model of human perception that internally processes
images seen in the world [40]. Ware cites a neural network model of
structural object perception, developed by Hummel and Biederman
[18], who give a highly mechanical account of how the (universal)
human brain goes through a hierarchical sequence of processing
stages leading to object recognition. ‘Visual information is decom-
posed first into edges, then into component axes, oriented blobs and
vertices’ [40, p. 255].
The critique of classical AI is significant for information security
issues. If human intelligence is embodied and situated, then the lim-
its to technologies that can detect socio-technical risks and vulner-
abilities would seem to loom large. The phenomenological model of
intelligence suggests that the uniqueness and situatedness of each
risk scenario inevitably thwarts the project to abstract, predict and
ultimately universalize human behaviour. The post-Turing school
might counter, however, that it is just a matter of building a predict-
ive model fine-grained enough to define all the variables. As noted
above, cybercrime is typically modelled by assessing precursors
based on both suspicious behaviour patterns in network traffic and
targeted insiders with a potential to turn ‘bad’ (e.g. a disgruntled
employee). Yet, predictive assessments used in information security
struggle to identify behaviour that is improvised rather than mali-
ciously premeditated.
Predictive assessment and profiling
The surveillance model of information security also poses significant
political questions. Automating the identification of abnormal
behaviour may seem pragmatic to a security practitioner, but seen as
the offshoot of a broadening practice of state and law officials, it
speaks to a larger civil liberties debate. Crampton notes how con-
temporary crime mapping enables geoprofiling to isolate behaviour
that does not conform to the norm, but points to a controversial out-
come in, for example, the high-profile case of racial profiling of
African–American drivers by police on the New Jersey turnpike [6,
p. 120]. Foucault’s distinction between making criminal judgement
based on violations of the law and judgements based on perceived
potential for crime is thus made vivid.
This line of critique also has an impact on the attack tree
approach to security visualization being explored as part of ongoing
research. Based on predictive modelling of risk, it extends a model
of security that depends for support on what Crampton calls a
‘discourse of risk’ [5, p. 139].
Crudely characterized, the notion that thinking machines and
risk visualizations can be developed to assist in identifying vulner-
abilities and malicious insiders represents a ‘search and destroy’
approach to information security that reveals its military underpin-
nings. As W.J. Perry, the former US undersecretary of State for
Defense, famously puts it, ‘once you can see the target you can
expect to destroy it’ [38, p. 4]. Paul Virilio has argued that the logis-
tics of perception are inseparable from the tactics of war, from the
use of military photography and film in aerial reconnaissance during
World War I, to the spy satellites, video missiles and drones in
World War II and the ‘ubiquitous orbital vision of enemy territory’
today. He writes, ‘There is no war . . . without representation.’
Foucault’s famous theorization of the panopticon as the blue-
print for today’s disciplinary society [11], with its inclination to ob-
serve and normalize, casts security visualization tools in a revealing
light. The concept for the panopticon’s design, by social theorist
Jeremy Bentham was for a structure in which a single watchman
could observe all inmates of an institution without the inmates
knowing if they were being watched or not (Fig. 9). As a result, they
act as though they are being watched at all times, which, Foucault’s
contemporary interpreters have argued, is a condition of the net-
worked age: not only is computer work easier to track, our daily so-
cial activity is voluntarily recorded and uploaded into vast
databases, suggesting that much daily activity is performed in the
knowledge that it destined for public view. Visualizations that depict
potential risks as well as actual attacks seem to contribute to the per-
formance of panoptic surveillance. The word performance is opera-
tive, however, since the great facilitator of cyberattacks is
anonymity. Much as the watchman in the panopticon could not
physically watch all inmates, neither could information visualization
capture all threats to a system’s security. So the ‘search and destroy’
visualization must perform a kind of mythical omniscience; it is a
weapon in the trajectory of ‘shock and awe’ tactics.
To develop this point, it is worth considering the position of one
of security’s harshest critics. In Mark Neocleous’s view, the fear-
mongering of security experts, politicians and opinion leaders,
serves a specific purpose. While purporting to address security, se-
curity politics has suppressed all political debates. Security has be-
come so all-encompassing a theme that it marginalizes all others
[25, p. 185]. By extension, then, do the visualizations of information
networks and their risk and vulnerability do anything more than
provide dazzling baubles with which to impress a public into think-
ing that we are in a state of insecurity, but something is being done
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about it by the experts? Or, perhaps, something is being done about
it by the experts’ technologies? If subjected to Neocleous’s critique,
the entire field of applied security visualization is governed by noth-
ing more than a kind of pageantry, to give the appearance of doing
something.
Security as resilience: an inverted approach
The challenge can be faced in a different way, however, by inverting
the dominant use of the word security and considering its constitu-
ent parts, notably as explicated by other disciplines. Security
theorist, Mark Neocleous, argues this point in his work ‘Critique of
Security’ [25] where he inverts the dominant use of the word secur-
ity across a variety of domains, by initially sketching the different
ways the term security is operationalized in political rhetoric and as
part of public policy and then arguing for a broader conceptua-
lization of security that includes networks of resilience, solidarity
and cooperation. Security as resilience is a particularly strong theme
in the work of security theorist Bill McSweeney [23] who outlines
an argument for recognition of a form of relational security that sup-
ports the sense of everyday security where an individual feels safe
and secure when going about their everyday activities [27].
Figure 9. ‘Panopticon’, Jeremy Bentham. From ‘The works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. IV’, 172–3. Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons.
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Relational security is the security derived from trusted relationships
upon whom an individual is reliant to carry out day-to-day tasks
and activities both at work and at home. McSweeney argues that
this form of security creates a freedom to take part in the day-to-day
events that are vital for the well being of the individual, the commu-
nity and the wider society. Without relational security, a form of
paralysis is experienced resulting from anxiety in the relationships
that are fundamental to day-to-day experiences. This aspect of
security is highly relevant to cybersecurity because the mission of
cybersecurity is, in part, about enabling the individual, the commu-
nity and wider society [38] to conduct their everyday lives in envir-
onments that have been (and continue to be) transformed by a
spectacular variety of digital media.
This type of security thinking changes the referent object from
data to people and considers the security of people through the
security of data not the security of data as an end in itself. A parallel
for this type of thinking can be found in fields of urban planning
and architecture. In the post-war discourse of architecture and
urban planning, the issue of security has been opened up by looking
not at criminal behaviour and how to design structures that keep it
out, but with a social theory of space, by looking at the way in
which social practices are manifest in physical structures. A chapter
titled ‘The Uses of Sidewalks: Safety’ in the critic Jane Jacobs’s influ-
ential book on American cities [19] provided a starting point for this
urban planning shift. Noting that the public peace is not primarily
kept by the police but by an ‘intricate, almost unconscious network
of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves,
and enforced by the people themselves’ Jacobs builds an argument
drawing from city crime statistics, a series of observed vignettes
from late 1950s New York (where she lived) and an emerging set of
guidelines. Cities—like computing clouds—have a constant influx of
strangers. For a city neighbourhood to be successful, by which
Jacobs means safe, it must have three main qualities: First, it must
have a clear demarcation between public and private; Secondly,
there must be ‘eyes upon the street, eyes belonging to those we might
call the natural proprietors of the street’ [19, p. 35]. And thirdly, the
street must be populated fairly continuously, both to increase the
number of eyes on the street to give those street watchers something
to look at. ‘Nobody enjoys sitting on a stoop or looking out a win-
dow at an empty street’ [19, p. 35]. Jacobs presents watching as a
form of looking, a form of observation that takes part on behalf of
the community and by the community. This is not watching to
report to a separate agency but a form of observation that is there to
protect the values of the community as decided by the community
and as protected by the community. This perspective on security is
an example of Smith’s generic description of security [35] as the pro-
tection of an ordered set of values where those who decide order
also determine the threats.
Jacobs’ polemic jolted post-war planners and architects out of a
separatist approach to city building, and helped bring about the
mixed use, more pedestrian friendly spaces that began ameliorating
the neighbourhoods annexed by highways and high rises in the
1960s and 1970s. To imagine how information security might be
better achieved requires temporarily, at least, moving away from the
fixation on networks and network traffic and focusing on the secur-
ity of people by looking at the social practices that surround infor-
mation exchange, by going back to the physical environments in
which trust and resilience are built. From the critique of AI, we can
hypothesize that information exchange is a social and embodied
practice. The working atmosphere in an organization’s headquarters
and its communication patterns may be, for instance, as important
to trust and resilience as its procedural practices. Standard network
visualizations do not typically depict working atmospheres or
communication patterns, suggesting that they are hiding the lessons
to be learned from situating data in space; how spatial practices
relate to livability, communication and safety.
A useful point of reference from architecture and urban planning
discourse comes from the Space Syntax Lab, which emerged out of
Bartlett School of Architecture and Planning in London. In their 1984
book, Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson argued that rather than
describing the built environment and then relating it to use, we need
to see how buildings and settlements ‘acquire their form and order as
a result of a social process’ [17, p. 8]. This is necessary because of the
long history of separating humans from buildings and studying the
buildings first as artefacts that generate meaning, which set up a prob-
lem of space being desocialized at the same time as society was despa-
tialized (Fig. 10). By focusing on the aggregations of spaces and how
they follow certain patterns in the development of cities—on geno-
types rather than phenotypes—Hillier and Hanson established a
method for looking at cities in terms of their spaces (and spatial con-
figurations) rather than their built forms (Fig. 11). The relations be-
tween inhabitants and strangers, they noted, had a big influence on
how a settlement grew in terms of the size and scope of the foci,
marketplaces and squares, and the connecting streets. In London and
cities in Europe, they argued, a governing principle was that import-
ant meeting points or foci were usually no more than two axial steps
apart, so that there is a point from which both foci could be seen. This
had an implication for urban safety. ‘The system works by accessing
strangers everywhere, yet controlling them by immediate adjacency to
the dwellings of the inhabitants. As a result, the strangers police the
space, while the inhabitants police the strangers’ [17, p. 18].
Space syntax analysis has developed a considerable array of visu-
alization methods, including ways of combining it with social net-
work analysis to study communication patterns. One recent study
examined communication patterns in five outpatient clinics in
Canada and the Netherlands, based on the knowledge that commu-
nication breakdowns are generally blamed for more than half of all
medical errors. As with the analysis of city meeting points and con-
necting streets, the analysis of communication patterns revealed that
long lines of sight and shared workspaces have the benefit of increas-
ing chances for encounter and communication, implying that less
communication breakdowns would result. The outcome of the
project has had an impact on the redesign of a Vancouver hospital
[28]. While clearly communication in and between outpatient clinics
could be visualized in terms of links and nodes, a situated communi-
cation analysis has revealed and addressed what might be described
in other circles as a network vulnerability.
Case studies
Research into participatory modelling of information exchange
practices has also informed this article [30]. It is the seemingly intan-
gible aspects of social behaviour and of information–communication
practices that very often affect the core business of social networks
and cloud computing, to take one example. Yet, the human dimen-
sion is usually glossed over in the study of cybersecurity (a dimen-
sion sometimes referred to as the ‘weakest link’). Differing degrees
of trust and solidarity lead to different perceptions of security, and
are difficult to visualize, let alone quantify.
To respond to this difficulty, a specially developed form of par-
ticipatory diagramming and physical modelling was used to visual-
ize and examine networks of trust and solidarity. A four-stage case
study was undertaken. The first stage used The ‘Archimate’
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framework to traditionally model the risks to the design of a
micropayment service that was to be implemented using IPTV. The
risks elicited in this stage did not reflect the networks of trust and
solidarity that were very apparent in the security thinking when
interviewing the service providers. In the next stage, the service pro-
viders identified their core values and the basis for engagement with
their customer base. In the last two stages of this process, the partici-
pants were given ‘LEGO’ building bricks of given types and colours,
selected so as to encode the movement of shared information and
data, actors and devices (Fig. 12). The Archimate framework for en-
terprise and risk analysis is referred to by the colour of bricks [20],
organizing the dimensions of the scenario that were social, technical
and infrastructural, while the organizational core values that had
previously been mapped from early engagements were carried
through the subsequent stages of analysis and interaction with the
participants (Fig. 13).
Physical modelling and its closely related co-design techniques
helped the group to construct a narrative, one which not always
Figure 10. Communication Patterns in Outpatient Clinics in Canada and the Netherlands. Reproduced with permission from The Bartlett School of Architecture,
University College, London.
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Figure 11. Urban Layout Value Map of the South East of England. Reproduced with permission from Space Syntax Limited and The Bartlett School of
Architecture, University College, London.
Figure 12. LEGO model from participatory sessions, 2015. Royal Holloway, London/TREsPASS. Key: 0¼Participant; 1¼Client; 2¼Card; 3¼TV; 4¼Remote;
5¼Client’s sphere of interest; 6¼Antenna on TV; 7¼Antenna on Card; 8¼Data TV to Card; 9¼Boundary between Client and Participant; 10¼Data Remote to
TV; 11¼Raspberry Pi; 12¼Cloud; 13¼Data TV to Cloud; 14¼Protection on Cloud; 15¼Bank; 16¼Account; 17¼Security on Bank; 18¼Data Cloud to Participant;
19¼Data Participant to Partner 23; 20¼Children; 21¼Security on Remote; 22¼Data Bank to Cloud; 23¼Partner 23; 24¼Participant Data management;
25¼Participant Server; 26¼Partner 26; 27¼ Intervention in progress; 28¼ Intervention pathway; 29¼Partner 29; 30¼Staff at Partner 23; 31¼Staff at Participant;
32¼Partner HA; 33¼Partner 33; 34¼Partner 34; 35¼Partner 35; 36¼Energy provider; 37¼Data Bill to Client; 38¼Governmental welfare agencies; 39¼ Income
source; 40¼Welfare benefits; 41¼Government systems; 42¼Additional cards; 43¼Partner bridges1; 44¼Partner bridges2; 45¼Troubleshooter; 46¼Data
Troubleshooter to Partners; 47¼Carer.
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fully spelled out by participants, and may occasionally appear to be
fragmentary, inconclusive and difficult to decipher for anyone out-
side the group that has built the representation. The physical model-
ling also clearly shows how communities interact with each other. In
‘LEGO’, the participants created groups of service users and service
providers and reflected how each group shared and protected data.
The physical model could be explored topologically to look at where
there were joins between these networks, query the nature of trust,
resilience and solidarity in these networks and how those values
travel between networks (Fig. 14).
Unravelling the many interwoven and layered elements of their
story, and visualizing the developing insights and understanding as
the group wrestle with complex service design issues, requires the de-
velopment of a new method for stabilizing and coding this type of
‘Serious Play’ data, a method which preserves the spoken and shared
understanding of the group as it deals with specific questions, directed
to distinct parts of the model. Keywords from these discussions can
be used to query our qualitative field data as a whole, and can ultim-
ately reveal high-level patterns within the understanding of the group,
which, for example, might display the perceived potential ‘impact’ of
‘hackers’ upon the ‘security’ over different parts of this particular
socio-technical story. Visualizing these patterns and showing where
key issues occur and how they interact with one another, is an oppor-
tunity to develop analysis in a way that has not been demonstrated by
more formal methods of risk analysis.
Keywords such as ‘risk’ and ‘impact’, for example, can be used to
detect where participants have linked these concepts to specific places
on the model, or, to groups of these nodes. Because the data concerns
a symbolic representation of a larger world projected down into a
small physical model, these patterns can in theory be visualized as
Figure 13. Picture of Participant natural areas of interest, concern and resilience. Royal Holloway, University of London/TREsPASS.
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cumulative temporal and spatial patterns [13], or even as ‘manifolds’
of social practice [29]. General patterns, at higher levels of societal
analysis, have previously only been schematically visualized, creating
pictorial metaphors for contrasting types of interlocking shapes and
mechanisms that have been found in social practices [33].
The situated and participatory approaches to visualization that
have been discussed here clearly have their limitations. A standard
critique is to ask how a delocalized information exchange network
that is transmitting gigabytes of data around the world might effect-
ively take into account the local and social factors of a situated
model. But such a question is framed, once again, by the epistemolo-
gical legacy that seeks to always abstract and universalize intelli-
gence and, on that basis, predict behaviour. One difficulty faced by
the allied but nevertheless distinct fields of information security visu-
alization and information security, is that their practitioners are
embedded in the pre-existing conditions from which their tasks are
structured, in what Heidegger called a state of ‘thrownness’ [16]. As
a result, it becomes difficult to conceive of visualization as anything
other than the visual display of quantitative evidence (to paraphrase
the title of a book by Edward Tufte).
We argue here that ‘improved’ visualizations of technologically
dense environments should reduce the complexity to a manageable
level by using the type of participatory data discussed above, to es-
tablish what constitutes a ‘sufficiently secure’ state of affairs for the
participants. Data can be structured in such a way that it results in
what philosopher Nelson Goodman called a more ‘graphically re-
plete representation’ [14], that should attain a density appropriate
to the source matter but not be overwhelmed by it. ‘What matters
with a diagram’ Goodman says, ‘as with the face of an instrument,
is how we are to read it’ [14, p. 170]. An interface design and visual-
ization strategy, therefore, emerges from an immersion in qualitative
as well as technical data, an approach which straddles both dia-
grammatic and pictorial conventions, and offers a schema that takes
the best of both worlds (Figs 15 and 16). In the process it supercedes
the traditionally attenuated and technically slanted forms of visual-
ization that are to be found in the literature. Visualizations that
have been grounded in qualitative field data gathered via inductive
research methods (methods refs), thus naturally lead to the develop-
ment of new criteria for the assessment of visualizations, criteria
which will most usefully provide specific reference to the categories
Figure 14. The elements of the LEGOmodel have here been rearranged into a digital collage. The central area defines the essential relationships that are required
for the smooth transaction of the service, and this is supported by the outlying banking (bottom) and state systems (top). Royal Holloway, University of London/
TREsPASS.
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Figure 15. Prototype graphical user interface sketch, showing how excerpts from the qualitative data ‘pop-up’ on request and add further dimensions to the
two-dimensional diagrammatic representation of the service design. Royal Holloway, University of London/TREsPASS.
Figure 16. Prototype graphical user interface sketch for constructing a navigator map for the business scenario, seen in circular plan view and as a superimposed
relief version of the same mapping, seen in side view. The reliefs are generated from values obtained from the participatory engagements. Royal Holloway,
University of London/TREsPASS.
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and qualities found in the data itself. Moreover, the multiple
perspectives and interpretations embedded in these ‘rich’ visual-
izations (Fig.17) are especially suited to the increasingly multidiscip-
linary nature of this work.
If behaviour is embodied and situated, as the Space Syntax lab
has demonstrated, it becomes imperative to study the physical places
and the social situations where security and security risks typically
occur, as well as those where ‘everyday’ routines prevent such events
from occurring. This is to understand not just how, why and as part
of what social practices human error created a ‘weak link’, but
where and how organizations have successfully avoided being made
into the targets of attacks and where and how strong, resilient social
networks are formed.
Situated, participatory approaches to visualization can then be
positioned as a complement to the more familiar visualization tools
used to model global networks and support the ‘search and destroy’
approaches discussed above. The term ‘mesh networks’ has been
used to describe how communities of practice are connected across
distances, wherein the notion of proximity is extended by communi-
cations technology. Another relevant tool for the exploration of
trust networks across distances is crowdsourcing, which typically
depends on a high degree of goodwill among its participants to
achieve an agreed common goal.
A final example: after post-election violence erupted in Kenya in
2007, a group of volunteers set up an open source platform for
tracking and geolocating reports of incidents sent by email and SMS
[31, n.56]. The system, called ‘Ushahidi’, proved particularly power-
ful after the Haitian earthquake of 2010 as a crisis-mapping oper-
ation through which people and organizations posted their most
urgent needs, and volunteers picked up and translated messages sent
via email, SMS, social media and voicemail. The mapping that
emerged during these projects shifted the focus of security towards
temporary insecure spaces of emergency (that will become increas-
ingly common with population shifts and climate change). It also
presents a model that simultaneously identifies vulnerability and
builds resilience.
Conclusions
At the turn of the 21st century, Peter Sloterdijk argued that ‘The
guiding morphological principle of the polyspheric world we inhabit
is no longer the orb, but rather foam’ [34, p. 71]. In other words,
the era in which humans imagined they could embark on achieving
one all-seeing, all-encompassing, omniscient tool, be it a geoscope,
datasphere, thinking machine or ‘the singularity’ has irrevocably
passed. We cannot see our way through foam as we could in the
large orb, but we can at least work out methods, strategies and tac-
tics for navigating through it. To adapt Sloterdijk’s morphology, in
today’s complex, multivalent, multicultural world, we need not one
tool, but lots of them, tuned to the needs of different social and
cultural practices.
Another metaphor and potentially useful model is provided by
the prolific business of visualization in genomics. As Manuel Lima
observes, the figure of a tree provided a valuable motif for hundreds
of years of biological research, expressing ‘multiplicity (represented
by its boughs, branches, twigs and leaves) from unity (its central
foundational trunk)’ [21, p. 25]. But after the discovery of horizon-
tal gene transfer, in which biological organisms incorporate genetic
material from different organisms without being their offspring, the
tree of life has come to seem too hierarchical, centralized and static.
Biologist Johann Peter Gogarten has suggested that a net provides a
better metaphor for visualizing the ‘rich exchange and cooperative
effects of HGT among microbes’ [21, p. 69].
One would suspect that information security, which in its true
sense has a multidisciplinary complexity comparable to genomics,
will be driven by a similar imperative to develop new metaphors and
new ways of visualizing the rich exchange and cooperative effects of
information among humans.
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